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Administrative Law
Chelsea M. Lamb*
Moses M. Tincher**
Matthew M. White***
Hannah M. Couch****
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021, in
which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case. 1
Review of decisions by administrative agencies will be the first topic
discussed, followed by cases discussing discretionary appeals, followed by
cases discussing procedural requirements, with scope of authority to
follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing statutory
construction.
II. REVIEW OF DECISIONS BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
In Trejo-Valdez v. Associated Agents,2 Jose Trejo-Valdez (the Worker)
injured his back while working for Associated Agents (the Company) and
filed a worker’s compensation claim for his injuries. The injury occurred
as the Worker was carrying a marble bathtub up a flight of stairs and the
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1. For an analysis of administrative law during the prior Survey period, see Chelsea
M. Lamb, Moses M. Tincher, and Matthew M. White, Administrative Law, Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2020).
2. 357 Ga. App. 461, 850 S.E.2d 863 (2020).
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bathtub fell on him. After having two back surgeries, the Worker’s doctor
recommended a spinal cord stimulator placement (the Treatment). 3
Two doctors suggested the Treatment, two believed there was no basis
for the Treatment, and one suggested a temporary trial of the Treatment.
The Worker’s Compensation Board (the Board) Administrative Law
Judge (the ALJ) initially rejected the recommended Treatment because
the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that the Worker
needed the Treatment “at this time.” 4 The ALJ then designated a new
doctor, recognizing that the Worker was entitled to ongoing medical
benefits and that the course of his treatment could change. The new
doctor subsequently recommended a temporary trial of the Treatment,
which the ALJ approved.5
Upon approval, the Company filed a notice of controvert arguing (1)
res judicata barred the Treatment because the ALJ initially denied it,
and (2) regardless of whether the Treatment was denied, it was neither
reasonable nor necessary. The ALJ held (1) res judicata did not bar the
claims because worker’s compensation cases constantly evolve with new
questions of fact, and (2) the Company bore the burden of proof as to
whether the treatment was reasonable and necessary. The Company
appealed and the Board’s Appellate Division affirmed the ALJ’s
decision.6
The Company then appealed the decision to the Superior Court of
Dekalb County. The superior court reversed the Board’s decision, holding
(1) the Board erroneously placed the burden of proof upon the Company,
and (2) res judicata barred the claims regardless.7
After the Georgia Court of Appeals granted the Worker’s application
for discretionary appeal, the Worker appealed the superior court’s
decision. The Georgia Court of Appeals held (1) res judicata did not bar
the Worker’s claims, and (2) the Company bore the burden of proving the
treatment was not reasonable or necessary. 8
As to the first issue, while the court stated that, although res judicata
applies to worker’s compensation claims where the issues are identical,
the issues here (decided by the ALJ in two separate orders) were not
identical—although the same treatment was considered in each—
because new medical issues arose, including a new doctor and new
suggested courses of treatment, and holding otherwise would “foreclose
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 461, 850 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 462, 850 S.E.2d at 865.
Id.
Id. at 463, 850 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 463–64, 850 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 469, 850 S.E.2d at 869.
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any additional treatment following an ALJ’s award.”9 The court stated
that this position would “confound[] the underlying purpose of the
Worker’s Compensation Act[,]” which should be liberally construed. 10
Regarding the second issue, the court of appeals stated the plain
language of State Board of Worker’s Compensation Rule 205(d)(1) 11
placed the burden of proof on the Company. 12 Citing O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-104(b),13 the court stated: “In issues concerning a change in
condition for the worse . . . the burden of proof rests with the claimant.” 14
But in cases like this in which “medical treatment is controverted on the
grounds that the treatment is not reasonably necessary,”15 the court,
citing State Board of Worker’s Compensation Rule 205(d)(1), stated that
“‘the burden of proof shall be on the employer.’”16 The court thus reversed
the superior court’s ruling.17
In Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC v. Department of Community
Health,18 the Georgia Department of Community Health (the
Department) granted MCG Health, Inc. d/b/a/ Georgia Regents Medical
Center (Georgia Regents) a Certificate of Need (CON) to build a new
short-stay hospital. Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC (DHA) had
competed against Georgia Regents for the CON and lost. “Although the
applications differed in terms of location, size, and overall cost, each
proposed construction of a new, 100-bed short-stay facility” in Columbia
County, which did not have a hospital and whose government pledged to
fund more than twenty percent of the costs. DHA petitioned the Superior
Court of Fulton County for review, which affirmed the Department’s
9. Id. at 465–67, 850 S.E.2d at 867–68.
10. Id. at 467, 850 S.E.2d at 868.
11. STATE BOARD OF WORKER’S COMPENSATION, r. 205(d)(1) (2019).
12. Trejo-Valdez, 357 Ga. App. at 468, 850 S.E.2d at 869.
13. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (2020).
14. Trejo-Valdez, 357 Ga. App. at 467, 850 S.E.2d at 868.
15. Id. at 468, 850 S.E.2d at 868. The Worker included two arguments that were not
enumerated as error, so the court refused to consider them but “nevertheless” rendered
them moot in light of its decision on the res judicata issue: “(1) finding that the [Treatment]
was not medically necessary; and (2) requiring him to plead a change in condition in order
to revisit the disapproval of his [Treatment].” Id. at 468, 850 S.E.2d at 869. Chief Judge
McFadden concurred specially in part as to this issue. Id. at 469, 850 S.E.2d at 869
(McFadden, C.J., concurring in part). He disagreed with the majority’s position that the
Worker’s “failure to enumerate as error his additional arguments precludes [the court’s]
review of those arguments” because “[p]arties often include summaries of their arguments
in their enumerations of error[,] . . . [b]ut they are not required.” Id. at 470, 850 S.E.2d at
870 (McFadden, C.J., concurring in part).
16. Id. at 467–68, 850 S.E.2d at 868.
17. Id. at 469, 850 S.E.2d at 869.
18. 356 Ga. App. 428, 847 S.E.2d 614 (2020).
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holding.19 After granting the Department’s application for discretionary
appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals heard the case. 20 It held the
Department correctly awarded the CON to Georgia Regents based in part
on tie-breaker considerations.21
“Entities seeking to establish a new healthcare service or facility in
Georgia generally must apply for a CON.”22 The Department, which
administers Georgia’s CON program, reviews CON applications “in light
of 17 general considerations”23 listed under O.C.G.A. § 31-6-42(a).24 The
Department has adopted administrative rules and regulations regarding
these considerations,25 including an exception when the facility “is a sole
community provider and more than twenty percent (20%) of the capital
cost of any new, replacement or expanded facility is financed by the
county governing authority[,]” pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 31-6-21(b)(8).26
DHA made multiple arguments considered on appeal. First, DHA
argued the Department’s county-financed exception contravened the
CON statutory scheme and was unreasonable because it did not further
the health-planning purposes of the CON program, rendering the
exception invalid.27 The court was not convinced. 28 It held that nothing
in the CON statutory scheme forbade such an exception. Although the
Department normally must abide by a numerical need methodology, the
court held that the Department correctly applied the county-financed
exception.29 Further, the court found that the exception has been part of
the scheme “since the rule became effective in 2005,” and that the
General Assembly’s acquiescence to the rule “is evidence that the rule
came within its intent as expressed by the Code[.]” 30 The court also held
the purpose behind the exception was to balance many policy
considerations, and the county-funded exception “reflects commitment to
economic development and a desire to make communities more attractive
places to live and work.”31

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 428–29, 847 S.E.2d at 616–17.
Id. at 428, 847 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
Id. at 429, 847 S.E.2d at 617.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-42(a) (2020).
Drs. Hosp. of Augusta, LLC, 356 Ga. App. at 430, 847 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 430–31, 847 S.E.2d at 618 (citing O.C.G.A. § 31-6-21(b)(8) (2021)).
Id. at 431, 847 S.E.2d at 618–19.
Id. at 432, 847 S.E.2d at 618.
Id. at 431, 847 S.E.2d at 618.
Id. at 432, 847 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 433, 847 S.E.2d at 619.
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Second, DHA argued MCG Health’s application did not meet the needs
of the hospital because the Department previously denied CON
applications for a free-standing emergency room in the area. 32 However,
the court held the Department “was authorized to conclude that Georgia
Regent’s CON application met the general need requirements for a new
short-stay hospital” because considerations for an acute care hospital
differ from considerations regarding a free-standing emergency room,
and the evidence supported that finding. 33
Third, DHA argued that the Department failed to conduct an
alternatives analysis—required under O.C.G.A. § 31-6-42 and the
Department’s accompanying regulation—to see whether alternatives to
the hospital might suffice.34 But the court noted the Department found
that “[t]here [were] no existing alternatives to [Georgia Regents’] project
except for maintaining the status quo, which would not adequately serve
the needs of the service area.”35 The court refused to “substitute [its] own
judgment for that of the Department” and held the Department
“conducted a detailed existing alternatives analysis.”36
Fourth, DHA argued that the Department improperly applied the “tie
breaker” considerations required when, such as here, all CON
applications meet the general and service-specific CON criteria.37 Tie
breaker or “priority” considerations include the past and present records
of the facility and other facilities in Georgia owned by the same parent
organization “regarding the provision of service to all segments of the
population, particularly including Medicare, Medicaid, minority patients
and those patients with limited or no ability to pay[.]”38 The Department
found that Georgia Regents should receive three grounds of priority
consideration, while DHA received none. The court held the Department
considered all relevant records and found “no error” made by the
Department.39
Finally, DHA argued the superior court applied the wrong standard of
review, but the court of appeals found that any error made by the lower
court was immaterial because the appellate court reviews the final

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 433, 847 S.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 433–34, 847 S.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 434, 847 S.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 434–35, 847 S.E.2d at 620.
Id.
Id. at 435, 847 S.E.2d at 621.
Id. at 436, 847 S.E.2d at 621.
Id.
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agency decision, not the superior court’s review of that decision. 40
Accordingly, the court affirmed the Department’s decision. 41
III. DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
In CKCG Healthcare Services v. Georgia Department of Community
Health,42 the Georgia Department of Community Health investigated
two licensed private home providers and found that the providers
improperly used nursing assistants against department rules and state
law, both of which prevent “the use of unlicensed independent contractors
to provide home care services.”43
The two providers jointly filed a declaratory judgment action in Fulton
County Superior Court to argue that the relevant statute—O.C.G.A.
§ 31-7-30044—does not prohibit the use of nursing assistants to provide
home care services and that the Department’s regulations conflicted with
the relevant statute.45 The superior court denied the petition, holding
“that the statute does not allow the use of certified nursing assistants as
independent contractors to provide home health care services, that the
department’s regulations [were] consistent with the statute” in question,
and that the providers violated both state law and department rules
when the providers used certified nursing assistants as independent
contractors to provide home health care services. The providers
thereafter filed a direct appeal, which the Department moved to dismiss
on the grounds that the appeal failed “to comply with the mandatory
application procedures of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.”46 The Georgia Court of
Appeals agreed that the appeal must be dismissed for failing to meet the
requirements of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.47
In so deciding, the court stated that “O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) requires
an application for [a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts
reviewing decisions of state and local administrative agencies.” 48 It
explained that “[a]n act of an administrative agency is a ‘decision’ within
the meaning of this statute only when it is a determination of an
‘adjudicative nature,’” and that “[d]eterminations of an adjudicative

40. Id. at 437–38, 847 S.E.2d at 622.
41. Id. at 438, 847 S.E.2d at 622.
42. 357 Ga. App. 76, 849 S.E.2d 803 (2020).
43. Id. at 76, 849 S.E.2d at 804.
44. O.C.G.A. § 31-7-300 (2021).
45. CKCG Healthcare Services, 357 Ga. App. at 76–77, 849 S.E.2d at 804.
46. Id. at 77, 849 S.E.2d at 804.
47. Id. at 77, 849 S.E.2d at 804–05.
48. Id. at 77, 849 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 301 Ga. 635,
636–37, 803 S.E.2d 66 (2017)).
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nature, [unlike those of a legislative nature], are immediate in
application, specific in application, and commonly involve an assessment
of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and
properties.”49
With these principles in mind, the court decided that the Department’s
determinations were adjudicative in nature because they involved an
investigation and assessment of facts about the providers, and that the
Department’s determinations were immediate and specific in application
to the providers because they assessed specific violations of Department
rules and directed immediate corrective action.50 Given that the
providers appealed from the superior court’s decision reviewing
adjudicative decisions of the Department, the court held that the
providers “were required . . . to bring their appeal by way of an
application for discretionary review” pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).
Because the providers failed to do so, the court held that it was without
appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. 51
In Clay v. Douglasville-Douglas County Water and Sewer Authority,52
Robert Clay (Clay) sought to construct an auto repair shop on a less than
one-acre piece of land in the City of Douglasville (the City). Clay
submitted building plans to the Douglasville-Douglas County Water and
Sewer Authority (WSA) that showed the building would create less than
5,000 square feet of water-impervious surface area that would not fall
within state regulations requiring water treatment systems. The WSA
did not accept or reject Clay’s building plans, but rather marked-up the
plans to note that the plans created more than 5,000 square feet of new
or replaced impervious water surface, and therefore, the construction
needed to comply with water treatment regulations. 53
Thereafter, Clay requested a variance from WSA’s regulations
mandating water treatment on the new property. The WSA denied Clay’s
variance request, stating that the requirements came from the State of
Georgia and that the WSA is required to enforce them under its
Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System Permit from the State. Clay
then filed suit in superior court arguing that the WSA wrongfully applied
its regulations, because the regulations at issue were superseded by
federal and state law. Moreover, Clay asserted that application of the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. (quoting Schumacher, 301 Ga. at 637, 803 S.E.2d at 69).
Id. at 77, 849 S.E.2d at 805.
Id.
357 Ga. App. 434, 848 S.E.2d 733 (2020).
Id. at 434–35, 848 S.E.2d at 735.
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regulations amounted to “an inverse condemnation of his property and
that the defendants acted fraudulently and in bad faith.” 54
The WSA and City moved to dismiss Clay’s complaint on several
grounds, which the superior court ultimately granted, holding that “the
WSA has correctly applied the regulations to Mr. Clay’s plans, and
therefore he does not have a case for inverse condemnation.” 55 The
superior court further held that “the species of ‘taking’ that Mr. Clay has
alleged is via the government’s use of regulatory or police powers, not
eminent domain[,]” and therefore, “he has not made out a case that what
is proposed here is a ‘taking’ of his property.” Thereafter, Clay filed a
direct appeal.56
Notably, even though neither party raised the issue, the Douglas
County Superior Court inquired into whether it had jurisdiction over the
case, and ultimately determined it did not. 57 In so holding, it began by
stating that O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)58 requires that plaintiffs file an
application for discretionary appeal when seeking review of a superior
court judgment that reviewed the decision of an administrative agency.59
Given that, the court inquired into whether there was (1) a decision (2)
of an administrative agency (3) that was subject to review by the superior
court. In doing so, the court explained that a “‘decision,’ as it is used with
reference to administrative agencies, is a determination of an
adjudicative nature.”60 The court further explained that no formal
adjudicative procedure is required and that an administrative
determination is deemed adjudicative if “it is particular and immediate,
rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general
and future in effect.”61 The court specified that adjudicative decisions are
“immediate in application, specific in application, and commonly involve
an assessment of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses,
and properties.”62
Applying this standard, the court determined that the WSA’s decision
to deny Clay’s variance request was an adjudicative determination,
because the WSA “simply determined that based on the size of Clay’s
54. Id. at 435, 848 S.E.2d at 735.
55. Id. at 435–36, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
56. Id. at 436, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
57. Id.
58. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) (2021).
59. Clay, 357 Ga. App. at 436, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
60. Id. (quoting State v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 299 Ga.
392, 399, 788 S.E.2d 455, 462 (2016)).
61. Id. at 436, 848 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting Intl. Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,
299 Ga. at 401, 788 S.E.2d at 463).
62. Id. at 436, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
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property and the specifics of his proposed construction plans that the
applicable stormwater regulations barred Clay from proceeding without
taking corrective measures and that WSA was not authorized to grant a
variance.”63 Put differently, “WSA’s denial was based on the particulars
of Clay’s proposal and the decision pertained to Clay’s property alone.” 64
The court also held that WSA is a local administrative agency for the
purposes of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) despite the term “local administrative
agency” not being defined in the Appellate Practice Act because it falls
within the common legal usage of the term “administrative agency.”65
Indeed, the court explained that, among other things, the WSA’s
establishment as a “public body corporate” with “power[s] to contract
with the City with respect to a water and sewage system,” and its
“authority to implement a stormwater management program,” pursuant
to an intergovernmental agreement with the City warranted its
conclusion that the WSA is a local administrative agency for the purposes
of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).66
With respect to whether Clay’s action in the superior court sought
“review” of the WSA’s decision requiring a discretionary appeal under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), the court noted that its prior decision in
Brownlow v. City of Calhoun,67 which held that a final judgment in an
action filed in superior court principally on the theory on inverse
condemnation was subject to direct appeal “failed to fully address the
degree to which trial court judgments that arise out of administrative
agency decisions are subject to the discretionary appeal procedure.” 68 The
court stated that Georgia Supreme Court decisions decided after
Brownlow “shed light on which cases are subject to discretionary review,
as well as a decision that addresses the nature of inverse condemnation
claims in general.”69 In explaining this, the court focused on five points.70
First, the court, looking at the substance of the underlying proceedings
and not just the relief sought, found that at a “basic level,” the superior
court reviewed the agency’s decision because it addressed the issue that
Clay brought before the court.71

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 437, 848 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 437, 848 S.E.2d at 736–37.
198 Ga. App. 710, 402 S.E.2d 788 (1991).
Clay, 357 Ga. App. at 438, 848 S.E.2d at 737.
Id.
See Id. at 438–40, 848 S.E.2d at 737–38.
Id. at 438, 848 S.E.2d at 737.
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Second, the court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court has held that
“one factor to be considered [i]n determining whether a discretionary
appeal is required is whether the appellant has already been heard in
two tribunals on the relevant issues, once by the administrative agency
and once by the superior court.”72 In applying this principle, the court
opined that Clay’s argument was addressed both by the agency and the
superior court, which supported requiring discretionary appeal. 73
Third, the court cited Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County,74 for
the proposition that actions “‘couched in terms of an inverse
condemnation [action] are subject to the same . . . deadlines as all [the]
appeals of administrative agency decisions.’” 75 The court concluded that
from this principle, it “follows that a judgment by a superior court in an
inverse condemnation action arising out of an administrative agency
decision constitutes an appeal of that decision.” 76 Looking to Clay’s claim,
the court concluded that because it implicitly asserted that WSA’s denial
of the requested variance resulted in an unconstitutional taking in the
form of inverse condemnation, Clay “necessarily sought a review of the
WSA decision” in superior court.77
Fourth, the court of appeals looked to the Georgia Supreme Court’s
decision in Schumacher v. City of Roswell,78 which clarified earlier
decisions regarding discretionary appeals. 79 Specifically, looking to
Schumacher, the court determined that O.S. Advertising Co. of Georgia
v. Rubin,80 which involved the Georgia Supreme Court dismissing an
appeal of a constitutional claim rooted in an administrative agency’s
denial of an individual variance request, was analogous to Clay’s claim
in that Clay’s claim involved “the denial of an individual variance request
even though his superior court action was couched in terms of inverse
condemnation.”81
Finally, the court found that Brownlow’s conclusion, namely that “‘the
word ‘condemnation’ as it appears in the exceptions to the rule of
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (a)(1) was intended by the legislature to except ‘inverse’
as well as classic condemnation cases therefrom[,]’” is no longer
72. Id.
73. Id. at 438, 848 S.E.2d at 737–38.
74. 294 Ga. 212, 751 S.E.2d 51 (2013).
75. Clay, 357 Ga. App. at 438–39, 848 S.E.2d at 738 (citing Mortgage Alliance Corp.,
294 Ga. at 215–16, 751 S.E.2d at 54).
76. Id. at 439, 848 S.E.2d at 738.
77. Id.
78. 301 Ga. 635, 803 S.E.2d 66 (2017).
79. Clay, 357 Ga. App. at 439, 848 S.E.2d at 738.
80. 267 Ga. 723, 482 S.E.2d 295 (1997).
81. Clay, 357 Ga. App. at 439, 848 S.E.2d at 738.
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controlling.82 The court reasoned that Brownlow relied on an outdated
reading that inverse condemnation actions are not subject to
discretionary appeals, a conclusion that the Georgia Supreme Court
criticized on the basis that inverse condemnation actions relate to
concerns different than those relevant to eminent domain. 83
Taken altogether, the court held that Clay was required to file an
application for discretionary review rather than file a direct appeal and
therefore dismissed Clay’s claim. 84 The court also held that its decision
in Brownlow “must be disapproved to the extent it holds otherwise.” 85
In Jordan v. Department of Natural Resources, Environmental
Protection Division,86 elevated levels of a known carcinogen, ethylene
oxide, were detected in certain areas of Atlanta and linked to Sterigenics,
U.S., LLC’s medical-sterilization operations in Cobb County. In August
2019, the Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection
Division (the EPD) entered into a consent order with Sterigenics in an
attempt to stop the release of ethylene oxide. Notably, the EPD finalized
the consent order without any public notice or input.87
The appellants, who lived near Sterigenics facility, filed a complaint
seeking declaratory relief, arguing that the consent order was invalid
because it was issued prior to the required notice and comment period.
The EPD moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the appellants
failed to state a claim under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1088 and, therefore, “failed
to identify a means of overcoming sovereign immunity.” 89 The Fulton
County Superior Court granted the EPD’s motion to dismiss and held
that a declaratory judgment was improper given that the “parties’ rights
had already accrued, and there was no future uncertainty for either
party.”90
Thereafter, the appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. 91 On appeal,
the EPD argued that the appellants were not entitled to a direct appeal
from the dismissal of their petition of declaratory relief and that the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. (quoting Brownlow, 198 Ga. App. at 712, 402 S.E.2d at 790).
Id. at 439–40, 848 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. at 440, 848 S.E.2d at 739.
Id.
357 Ga. App. 625, 851 S.E.2d 214 (2020).
Id. at 625, 851 S.E.2d at 217.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10 (2021).
Jordan, 357 Ga. App. at 625–26, 851 S.E.2d at 217.
Id. at 626, 851 S.E.2d at 217.
Id.
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appellants were instead required to apply for a discretionary appeal
following the procedures provided in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.92
The Georgia Court of Appeals first noted that O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1)
requires an application to appeal “from decisions of the superior court
reviewing decisions of . . . state and local administrative agencies.” 93 In
doing so, the court explained that even though the word “decisions” is not
defined in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted
the term, in the instant context, to mean an agency “determination of an
adjudicative nature.”94 The court further explained that a decision is
adjudicatory in nature if it is “immediate in application, is specific in
application, and commonly involves an assessment of facts about the
parties and their activities, businesses, and properties” 95 as opposed to
determinations that are “‘quintessentially executive in nature’ such as
‘the day-to-day management of agency personnel and resources, the
dissemination of information to the public, the undertaking of law
enforcement and compliance investigations, and prosecutorial
determinations to initiate or decline to bring enforcement proceedings.’” 96
Looking to the facts of the case, the court determined that the consent
order was immediate and specific in application and, therefore,
adjudicative in nature because it involved “an assessment of Sterigenic’s
activities, business, and properties, all of which are key features of an
adjudicative decision.”97 After deciding that the subject matter
underlying the action, that is, the consent order, was an adjudicative
decision by an agency, the court looked to whether two tribunals had
already adjudicated the case.98 In doing so, the court noted that the intent
of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) was to provide appellate courts the discretion
to decline to hear an appeal where two tribunals had already adjudicated
the case.99
Importantly, the “‘rationale for requiring a discretionary application
does not apply where the person who seeks to appeal was not a party to
the administrative proceedings’ at issue.”100 Because Georgia courts look
to parties in administrative proceeding in the generic sense of whether
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) (2021)) (emphasis added).
94. Id. (quoting Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 399, 788 S.E.2d at 462).
95. Id. (quoting Wolfe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga., 300 Ga. 223, 228,
794 S.E.2d 85, 89 (2016)).
96. Id. (quoting Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 400-01(4)(a), 788 S.E.2d at 455).
97. Id. at 627, 851 S.E.2d at 218.
98. Id. at 628, 851 S.E.2d at 218.
99. Id.
100. Id. 628, 851 S.E.2d at 218–19 (quoting Ladzinske v. Allen, 280 Ga. 264, 265, 626
S.E.2d 83, 85 (2006)).
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the challenger participated (or could have participated but purposefully
did not) in the administrative proceedings at issue, the court turned its
focus on whether the appellants had standing to participate “in some
level of administrative proceedings before filing their declaratory
judgment action in the superior court.”101
The court began this analysis by looking to relevant statutes, namely
O.C.G.A. § 12-2-2(c)(2)(A), which provides that:
Any person who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any order or
action of the director shall, upon petition to the director within 30 days
after the issuance of such order or the taking of such action, have a
right to a hearing before an administrative law judge of the Office of
State Administrative Hearings . . . acting in place of the Board of
Natural Resources . . . 102

And that:
Persons are “aggrieved or adversely affected” . . . where the challenged
action has caused or will cause them injury in fact and where the
injury is to an interest within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statutes that the director is empowered to administer
and enforce . . . 103

The court explained that the plain-language standing requirements of
the statute had not been extensively explored by Georgia courts but are
materially identical to the two-part “zone of interest” test articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,104 and adopted by the Georgia
Supreme Court in Amdahl Corporation v. Georgia Department of
Administrative Services.105 The court went on to explain that, under the
two-part test, “a complainant has standing if the complainant alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact and if the
complainant is asserting an interest arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected by the statute.”106

101. Id. at 628, 851 S.E.2d at 219.
102. O.C.G.A. § 12-2-2(c)(2)(A) (2021); see Jordan, 357 Ga. App. at 628–29, 851 S.E.2d
at 219.
103. Jordan, 357 Ga. App. at 628–29, 851 S.E.2d at 219 (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 12-2-2(c)(3)(A) (2021)).
104. 397 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1970).
105. 260 Ga. 690, 398 S.E.2d 540 (1990); Jordan, 357 Ga. App. at 629, 851 S.E.2d at 219.
106. Jordan, 357 Ga. App. at 629, 851 S.E.2d at 219 (quoting Amdahl Corp., 260 Ga. at
696, 398 S.E.2d at 545).
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The court then inquired into whether the appellants had alleged an
injury-in-fact.107 The court noted that the appellants had alleged that
they lived near the Sterigenics facility know to emit ethylene oxide, and
that they were likely inhaling the airborne chemical as a consequence.
The court also noted that the appellants claimed the “emissions level
proposed in the consent order will ‘still exceed[] the acceptable annual
risk level by 12 to 24 times’ under state guidelines, thus posing a
continued and ongoing danger,” and that the EPD acted on the consent
order without first allowing residents the notice and opportunity to
comment.108 Taken together, the court determined that these allegations
were sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact.109
After determining that the appellants had sufficiently alleged an
injury-in-fact, the court turned to whether “‘the complainant is asserting
an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the
statute.’”110 In doing so, the court noted that the zone of interest test is
not one that is meant to be “especially demanding” and is rather designed
“to deny review where a party’s interests are ‘marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute.’” 111 The statute
relevant to this analysis, that is, the statute that formed the basis for the
consent order is O.C.G.A. § 12-9-1 et. seq.,112 which is known as the “The
Georgia Air Quality Act.”113 Per the court, the Act aims to “preserve,
protect, and improve air quality . . . to prevent the significant
deterioration of air quality and to attain and maintain ambient air
quality standards so as to safeguard the public health, safety, and
welfare consistent with providing for maximum employment and full
industrial development of the state.”114
Looking to the facts of the case, the court opined that the EPD is
tasked with the administration and enforcement of the Georgia Air
Quality Act and that the EPD is generally required to provide the public
with notice and opportunity to comment and provide information
regarding the proposed issuance of consent orders, like the order at issue.
115 Because the appellants’ alleged injury was the result of continuing

107. Id. at 629–30, 851 S.E.2d at 219–20.
108. Id. at 630, 851 S.E.2d at 220.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Amdahl Corp., 260 Ga. at 696, 398 S.E.2d at 545).
111. Id. at 631, 851 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n., 479 U.S.
388, 399 (II) (1987)).
112. O.C.G.A. § 12-9-1, et. seq. (2021).
113. Jordan, 357 Ga. App. at 631, 851 S.E.2d at 220.
114. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 12-9-2 (2021)).
115. Id.
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ethylene oxide emissions and the EPD’s failure to provide notice and the
opportunity to comment, the court determined that it “is clear that the
complaint asserts injuries that fall within the zone of interests protected
by the relevant statutes and regulations.” 116 Given the court’s
conclusions, it held that the appellants were required to apply for
discretionary appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 and because the
appellants failed to do so, the court dismissed the appellants’ appeal. 117
In Thomas County v. WH Group 2, LLC,118 WH Group submitted plans
to develop a subdivision that would include rental units to the Thomas
County Director of Planning and Zoning, but the Director refused to
submit the plans to the Thomas County Board of Commissioners on the
basis that the area was not zoned for rental units. After making another
request that the plans be submitted to the Board of Commissioners, WH
Group filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and complaint for
declaratory judgment in superior court requiring the plans to be
submitted to the county and declaring the restriction on rental units
illegal. The Thomas County Superior Court found that there was no
zoning restriction on the land and ordered the county to process WH
Group’s plans. In reaching its decision, the superior court found that the
county’s only official zoning document did not indicate any conditions on
the designation sought by WH Group and rejected Thomas County’s
“reliance on unrecorded meeting minutes as a basis for imposing a rental
restriction.”119 Thomas County appealed the superior court’s decision
thereafter.120
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals looked to O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(1) in deciding whether Thomas County was required to file an
application for discretionary appeal on the basis that the appeal was from
the decision of a superior court reviewing a decision of state or local
administrative agency.121 In doing so, the court noted that it had to
determine whether a “state or local administrative agency” had made a
“decision” as contemplated in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) and whether the
superior court reviewed said decision.122
The court first concluded that the Director’s action was an action by a
local administrative agency for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).123

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 632, 851 S.E.2d at 220–21.
Id. at 632, 851 S.E.2d at 221.
359 Ga. App. 201, 857 S.E.2d 94 (2021).
Id. at 201–02, 857 S.E.2d at 96.
Id. at 202, 857 S.E.2d at 96.
Id.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1)).
Id.
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In doing so, the court looked to Georgia Supreme Court precedent and
noted that if “the underlying subject matter of a mandamus petition
concerns an administrative ruling which is reviewed by a superior court,
a direct appeal will not lie. And this rule applies to appeals of local
governmental department decisions even if no administrative appeal was
taken.”124 In applying this principle, the court noted that the Director is
the head of Thomas County’s planning and zoning department and “is
responsible for reviewing plans and specifications to ensure they comply
with rules or restrictions imposed by the Board of Commissioners.” 125
Given this, the court concluded that the Director refusing to forward the
WH Group’s plans to the Board of Commissioners acted as a local
administrative department.126
The court next turned to whether the Director made a “decision.”127 In
doing so, the court explained that “decision,” as used in O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(a)(1), refers to an administrative determination that is
adjudicative rather than executive or legislative in nature. 128 The court
further explained that administrative determinations that are
adjudicative in nature “are immediate in application, specific in
application, and commonly involve an assessment of facts about the
parties and their activities, businesses, and properties” and do not
require formal adjudicative procedures.129 The court concluded that the
Director’s action was adjudicative in nature and, therefore, a “decision”
given that the Director’s refusal to forward WH Group’s plans was a
determination to “reject a single submission submitted by a specific
applicant, and it had the immediate and particular consequence of
disallowing that applicant from obtaining the necessary approval to
proceed with its development.” 130 Put differently, the “decision was not
based on general considerations, but was predicated on the allowed use
of a particular parcel of land and was therefore a determination of an
adjudicative nature.”131
The final point the court considered was whether the superior court
reviewed the Director’s decision. 132 In its consideration, the court noted
124. Id. at 202, 857 S.E.2d at 96 (quoting Selke v. Carson, 295 Ga. 628, 629, 759 S.E.2d
853, 854 (2014)).
125. Id. at 202, 857 S.E.2d at 96.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 202–03, 857 S.E.2d at 96–97.
129. Id. at 203, 857 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 401(4)(a), 788
S.E.2d at 463).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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that, when reviewing the nature of the proceedings in the superior court,
the court generally “look[s] to the substance of the proceedings, not
merely the form of relief sought.” 133 On this point, the court explained
that if “a party to a judicial proceeding attacks or defends the validity of
an administrative ruling and seeks to prevent or promote the
enforcement thereof, the trial court must necessarily ‘review’ the
administrative decision to resolve the merits of the case.” 134 In applying
this principle, the court observed that WH Group “directly attacked the
director’s decision in the mandamus claim that it filed in superior court,”
135 and sought a writ compelling Thomas County to process and approve
the plans WH Group submitted as consistent with the appropriate zoning
designation. Given this, the court concluded that the superior court
reviewed the administrative decision.136
Given its conclusions that Thomas County’s appeal was from the
decision of a superior court reviewing a decision of state or local
administrative agency, the court held that Thomas County was required
by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) to file its appeal via an application for
discretionary appeal.137 The court further held that Thomas County’s
failure to do so necessitated the dismissal of its direct appeal. 138
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
In Dessalines v. Department of Human Services,139 Germany
Dessalines (Dessalines) refused to allow the Division of Family and
Children Services (DFCS) of the Georgia Department of Human Services
(DHS) to “assess or aid her 17-year-old autistic child after an incident at
school in September 2018.”140 Because of this incident, DFCS placed
Dessalines’ name on a child abuse registry. Dessalines appealed the
decision to an administrative law judge (ALJ), who affirmed the
decision.141
Dessalines then filed a petition for judicial review in the Superior
Court of Gwinnett County. She attached a certificate of service to her
petition stating that she had served DFCS’s attorney, which was the

133. Id. (quoting Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 407, 788 S.E.2d at 467).
134. Id. at 203, 857 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 408, 788 S.E.2d
at 468).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 204, 857 S.E.2d at 97.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 356 Ga. App. 826, 849 S.E.2d 673 (2020).
140. Id. at 826–27, 849 S.E.2d at 674.
141. Id. at 826, 849 S.E.2d at 674.
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private attorney from the ALJ proceeding who was serving as a special
assistant attorney general (SAAG), and the Clerk of the Office of State
Administrative Hearings via U.S. Mail and electronic service. “The
electronic service consisted of an e-mail stating the docket number and
notifying the recipient of statutory electronic service of the following
attached documents: case initiation form, summons, petition for judicial
review, and certificate of service.” The following day, the SAAG emailed
Dessalines stating she received her email.142
The SAAG then filed a response to the petition and a motion to
dismiss. In her motion, the SAAG argued that she was not authorized to
accept service on behalf of DFCS and “that personal service [upon the
Commissioner of DHS] was required but had not been achieved.” 143
Dessalines then filed a sheriff’s entry of service showing “non est” for
an attempt to personally serve Gerlda Hines. 144 She noted: “Wrong
commissioner as Defendant unable to accept service per A. Johnson
(Executive Assistant).”145 In her response to the SAAG’s motion,
Dessalines outlined her service attempts and argued “personal service is
not required by law.”146 The superior court granted the motion, holding
(1) personal service was required under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(5)147, and (2)
electronic service was not consented to until after the petition was
filed.148
The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Dessalines’ application for
discretionary review and heard her appeal. 149 She argued personal
service was not required, and the court agreed. In its reasoning, the court
focused on whether the appeal to superior court was an original action
under the Georgia Child Protection Act (CPA) or more akin to the
superior court sitting as an appellate decisionmaker under the Georgia
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).150 The court, citing former O.C.G.A.
§ 49-5-181 of the CPA, noted that the procedures for an appeal to the
superior court “shall be substantially the same as those for judicial
review of contested cases under Code Section 50-13-19 [of the

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 826, 849 S.E.2d at 674–75; Hines is Commissioner of the DHS, GEORGIA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, https://dhs.georgia.gov/organization/about/gerlda-bhines (last accessed Aug. 31, 2021).
145. Dessalines, 356 Ga. App. at 826, 849 S.E.2d at 675.
146. Id. at 827–28, 849 S.E.2d at 675.
147. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(5) (2021).
148. Dessalines, 356 Ga. App. at 828, 849 S.E.2d at 675.
149. Id. at 828, 849 S.E.2d at 675.
150. Id. at 828–30, 849 S.E.2d at 675–76.
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APA] . . . .”151 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19,152 as previously construed by the court
in Schuman v. Department of Human Services,153 provides that service
by mail, as opposed to personal service, is sufficient. 154 It thus held that
“the additional step of personal service on the Commissioner of Human
Services was not required.”155 Accordingly, the court reversed the lower
court.156
V. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
In Georgia Professional Standards Commission v. Wilson-Williams,157
a student reported to her teacher that her father had been “touching”
her.158 The teacher immediately reported the allegation to WilsonWilliams—the school’s principal. Instead of reporting the matter right
away to the police, the principal decided to “wait until the following day
to take any action.” Before school the next morning, the student’s father
raped her. Because the principal did not report the alleged abuse right
away, the Georgia Professional Standards Commission revoked the
principal’s educator’s certificate.159
After the principal contested the agency’s finding, an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) found that “although Wilson-Williams had ‘not violated
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5, which requires mandatory reporters to report
suspected abuse within twenty-four hours, Dougherty County School
System’s policy required immediate reporting by a principal to the police
with no grace period.’”160
Rather than adopt the Commission’s penalty, the ALJ reduced the
penalty from absolute forfeiture to a two-year suspension. The principal
appealed the agency’s finding to the superior court arguing that the state
statute, which allows a twenty-four-hour grace period, preempted the
local school system policy. The superior court agreed and the reversed
the ALJ’s decision, holding that the local school system’s policies “must
bend and yield” to the state’s mandatory reporting statute, which
provides that “when a reporter learns of possible child abuse, she must
report it ‘immediately, but in no case later than 24 hours from the time
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 828, 849 S.E.2d at 675.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 (2021).
354 Ga. App. 509, 841 S.E.2d 218 (2020).
Dessalines, 356 Ga. App. at 829, 849 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 829, 849 S.E.2d at 675–76.
Id. at 831, 849 S.E.2d at 676.
355 Ga. App. 493, 844 S.E.2d 559 (2020).
Id. at 494, 844 S.E.2d at 561.
Id.
Id. at 494–95, 844 S.E.2d at 561–62.
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there is reasonable cause to believe that suspected child abuse has
occurred.’”161 Thereafter, the Commission appealed the superior court’s
decision.162
On appeal, the Commission argued that the superior court erred in
granting Wilson-Williams relief on the issue of preemption, as WilsonWilliams did not raise the defense during the administrative hearing.
More specifically, the Commission argued that the superior court “was
prohibited from considering whether Georgia’s mandatory reporting law
preempts the school system’s policy on reporting” due to Wilson-Williams
failing to raise the defense during the administrative hearing. 163
The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission. 164 It its
analysis, the court explained that:
[w]hether the defense of preemption is jurisdictional and thus not
waivable or waivable is a question of law we review de novo . . . The
defense of preemption is waivable where it merely dictates a different
choice of law. Here, the preemption defense is not jurisdictional
because a successful preemption defense under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5
would dictate only a change in law, not a change in forum.165

The court went on to explain that O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(e)166 provides,
in relevant part, that “[n]either the state board nor the superior court
shall consider any question in matters before the local board nor consider
the matter de novo, and the review by the state board or the superior
court shall be confined to the record,”167 and that, therefore, “[a]s an
appellate body, the Superior Court of [Dougherty] County (like the State
Board of Education) was not authorized to consider matters which had
not been raised before the local board.” 168
Looking to the facts of the case, the court opined that there was no
indication that Wilson-Williams raised the issue of preemption or argued
that she had reported the abuse within twenty-four hours as required by
state law at the local board level or in her appeal to the State Board. 169
161. Id. at 495, 844 S.E.2d at 562.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 496, 844 S.E.2d at 562.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Jones v. Sabal Trail Transmission, 336 Ga. App. 513, 516, 784 S.E.2d
865, 868 (2016).
166. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(e) (2021).
167. Georgia Professional Standards Commission, 355 Ga. App. at 496, 844 S.E.2d at
562 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(e)).
168. Id. (quoting Sharpley v. Hall County Bd. of Ed., 251 Ga. 54, 55(1), 303 S.E.2d 9, 10
(1983)).
169. Id. at 497, 844 S.E.2d at 562–63.
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Rather, the court noted that its review of the record showed that WilsonWilliams first asserted the preemption argument during her appeal to
the superior court.170 Given this, the court found that the superior court
was not authorized to consider the issue, meaning it erred in reversing
the ALJ’s decision on that rationale. Consequently, the court reversed
the superior court’s judgement.171
VI. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In Cobb Hospital, Inc. v. Emory-Adventist, Inc.,172 the plaintiffhospitals brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to declare that
Emory Healthcare, Inc.’s (Emory) acquisition of Emory-Adventist
Hospital violated the Hospital Acquisition Act (HAA). The Superior
Court of Cobb County denied plaintiffs’ request for relief, to which
plaintiffs appealed.173 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s finding.174
First, before addressing whether Emory’s acquisition of EmoryAdventist constituted a transaction to which the HAA applies, the court
explicated the fundamental rules of statutory construction. 175 These
rules require courts “to construe the statute according to its terms, to give
words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that
makes some language mere surplusage.” 176 The court further explained
that a statute “should be read according to its natural and most obvious
import of the language without resorting to subtle and forced
constructions for the purpose of either limiting or extending its
operation.”177
Applying these rules, the court observed that Georgia’s HAA applies
“any time the sale, purchase, or lease, of 50 percent or more of the assets
of a hospital owned, controlled, or operated by a nonprofit entity
occurs.”178 Under this Act, the entity for sale and the acquiring entity are
both subject to the notification and public hearing requirement if in fact

170.
171.
172.
2021).
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 497, 844 S.E.2d at 563.
Id.
357 Ga. App. 617, 851 S.E.2d 208 (2020), cert. denied, No. S21C0473 (Jun. 21,
Id. at 617, 851 S.E.2d at 209.
Id.
Id. at 618–19, 851 S.E.2d at 210–11.
Id. at 618–19, 851 S.E.2d at 210.
Id. at 619, 851 S.E.2d at 211.
Id. at 619, 851 S.E.2d at 211.
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a transaction has occurred.179 The court observed that under the HAA,
an “acquisition” means:
a purchase or lease by an acquiring entity of the assets of a hospital
which is owned, controlled, or operated by a nonprofit corporation and
which meets one or more of the following conditions: (A) Constitutes a
purchase or lease of 50 percent or more of the assets of a hospital
having a permit under this chapter.180

The court then interpreted the plain and clear definitions of
“acquisition,” “permit,” and “hospital” under the statute, as well as under
the Department of Community Health’s regulations and related statutes,
to conclude that Emory-Adventist did not constitute a hospital under the
HAA because it was no longer operating and had surrendered its
permit.181 Thus, the court concluded that because Emory did not engage
in a transaction of a hospital having a permit, it did not violate the HAA
when acquiring Emory-Adventist.182
In Premier Health Care Investments, LLC v. UHS of Anchor, L.P.,183
the Georgia Department of Community Health (Department)
promulgated a rule—known as the “Psychiatric Rule”—that required
licensed hospitals with a psychiatric/substance-abuse program
authorized by a Certificate of Need (CON) to obtain an additional CON
“to redistribute its inpatient beds in excess of those identified in its CON
to operate a psychiatric/substance-abuse program, but within its total
licensed bed capacity.”184 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
Department was authorized to promulgate such a rule to create a
category of institutional health services requiring a CON even when such
category is not listed in the relevant statute, O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40(a),185 and
the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed.186
The Court first examined the “plain text of O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40(a),”
which requires a CON for “any new institutional health service” and
specifically prescribes that “[n]ew institutional health services
include . . . [a]ny increase in the bed capacity of a health care facility[.]” 187
In so doing, the court relied on the fundamental principles that “we must

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 619–20, 851 S.E.2d at 211.
Id. at 622, 851 S.E.2d at 213 (emphasis added).
Id. at 622–23, 851 S.E.2d at 213.
Id. at 624, 851 S.E.2d at 214.
310 Ga. 32, 849 S.E.2d 441 (2020)
Id. at 32, 849 S.E.2d at 443.
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40(a) (2021).
Premier Health Care Investments, LLC, 310 Ga. at 32, 849 S.E.2d at 443.
Id. at 37, 849 S.E.2d at 446.
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afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view
the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read
the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary
speaker of the English language would.”188 Also, while the search for
statutory meaning typically ends when the statutory text is clear and
unambiguous, when the language is not obvious on its face, then courts
should employ other “tools of construction” to interpret and resolve its
meaning.189
The court observed that the statute, particularly the term “include” or
“including,” was not clear and unambiguous as it was open to two
plausible interpretations—both as a term of limitation and as a term of
expansion, depending on the context.190 In the context of the relevant
statute, in which the word “include” is followed by seven specifically
enumerated examples, the court, applying a textual and contextual
approach, concluded that the term introduces an “exhaustive list” of “new
institutional health services” for which a CON is required. 191
The court also reasoned that a broader construction of the term would
render specific phrases in the statute “superfluous” insofar as “it would
have been wholly unnecessary for the legislature to state that the general
phrase encompasses [so many] particular acts, if the list were meant to
be illustrative instead of an exhaustive list of specific new institutional
health services for which a CON is required.” 192 The court also stressed
the importance that a statute “should be construed to make all its parts
harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part.” 193
Other tools of construction implemented by the court to discern the
statute’s meaning included statutory history as well as the canon of
constitutional doubt.194 The court concluded that because the term
“include” may lead to two plausible interpretations, the controlling
interpretation is the one that avoids raising serious questions about the
constitutionality of the General Assembly’s delegation of rulemaking
authority to the Department.195 Accordingly, applying the various tools
of construction, the court held that O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40(a) “provides an
exhaustive list of new institutional health services for which a CON is

188. Id. at 39, 849 S.E.2d at 447 (citing Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–73(1)(a), 751
S.E.2d 337, 341 (2013)).
189. Id. at 39, 849 S.E.2d at 448.
190. Id. at 39–40, 849 S.E.2d at 448.
191. Id. at 43, 849 S.E.2d at 450.
192. Id. at 44, 849 S.E.2d at 451.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 48, 849 S.E.2d at 453–54.
195. Id. at 48–49, 849 S.E.2d at 454.
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required.”196 Thus, to the extent the Psychiatric Rule purported to
require a new CON for redistribution of psychiatric/substance-abuse
beds in a facility which has already secured CON approval to operate a
psychiatric/substance-abuse inpatient program within its total licensed
bed capacity, the court determined the Rule exceeds the Department’s
rulemaking authority.197
In Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance
Commission v. New Georgia Project Action Fund,198 the Government
Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission (Commission),
suspecting that the campaign of gubernatorial candidate, Stacey
Abrams, had improperly coordinated with several third-party nonprofit
organizations for the campaign’s material benefit, issued administrative
subpoenas to investigate its claim. The Commission then moved the
Fulton County Superior Court to compel the defendants to fully comply
with the subpoenas. In a one-paragraph order, the superior court denied
the motion, stating that it lacked jurisdiction. On appeal, the
Commission argued that it may seek judicial enforcement of its
administrative subpoenas under the Georgia Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).199 The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed.200
First, it recognized the fundamental principles of statutory
interpretation: that the statutory texts must be afforded its “plain and
ordinary meaning,” that courts must view the statutory text in the
context in which it appears, and that courts must “read the statutory text
in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
English language would.”201 Further, the court of appeals explained that
where the statutory text is “clear and unambiguous,” the statute is given
its “plain meaning,” and the “search for statutory meaning generally
ends.”202
With these principles in mind, the court noted that the APA “is meant
to provide a procedure for administrative determination and regulation
where expressly authorized by law or otherwise required by the
Constitution or a statute of this state.”203 Next, it examined the key
statutory provision under the APA:
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In proceedings before the agency, the hearing officer, or any
representative of the agency authorized to hold a hearing, if any party
or an agent or employee of a party . . . neglects to produce, after having
been ordered to do so, any pertinent book, paper, or document . . . the
agency, hearing officer, or other representative shall have the same
rights and powers given the court under Chapter 11 of Title 9, the
“Georgia Civil Practice Act.” If any person . . . refuses as specified in
this subsection, the agency, hearing officer, or other representative
may certify the facts to the superior court of the county where the
offense is committed for appropriate action, including a finding of
contempt.204

The court of appeals explained that in order to address whether the
Commission may seek judicial enforcement of its subpoenas under the
APA, the court must determine two issues: (1) whether the phrase
“proceedings before the agency” encompasses the Commission’s
preliminary investigation; and (2) whether the Commission’s subpoena
“ordered” the defendants to produce the requested materials. 205
Regarding the first issue, because the APA does not provide a clear
meaning of the phrase “proceedings before the agency,” the court looked
to other portions of the APA to help glean the meaning of the phrase. 206
For instance, the court observed that a substantial portion of the APA
when involving a “contested case” expressly referred to “a proceeding . . .
determined by an agency[.]”207 While the defendants argued that
“proceedings before the agency” are essentially a “contested case” that
refer to a more formal adjudicating proceeding, the court was not
convinced.208 The court explained that the General Assembly could have
expressly used that same term but instead chose to use “proceedings
before the agency,” and thus, the court held it “must give meaning to this
choice of words,” and that the phrase “proceedings before the agency” is
not merely a substitute for the term “contested case,” particularly when
viewing the APA as a whole.209
In addition to viewing the language in the context in which it appears,
the court of appeals looked to the plain meaning of the language itself. 210
Specifically, relying on various definitions of “proceedings” as well as
“administrative proceedings,” the court concluded that while
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“proceedings before the agency” could be understood as a more formal
process including a contested case, they could also be understood to
encompass an agency’s investigations, such as the one the Commission
undertook in this case.211
Regarding the second issue of whether, for purposes of the APA, the
subpoenas may “order” the defendants to produce the requested
documents, the court of appeals again relied on the plain definitions of
the word “order.”212 When used in the context of ordering or commanding
a person or party to produce a “book, paper, or document” as stated in the
APA, the court explained that the statutory language could be
interpreted as an agency order compelling the production of information
or documents through administrative subpoenas, such as the ones issued
here.213
Any other reading, the court held “would require that an agency, as a
prerequisite to seeking relief in the superior court, issue some unspecified
formal order to compel compliance with its own subpoena after a person
or party has already neglected to comply with an agency’s demand for the
production of materials.”214 Accordingly, applying the fundamental
principles of statutory construction, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court’s order and concluded that O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(b) “affords the
Commission authority to seek enforcement of its administrative
subpoenas in the superior court[.]”215
In Grand Canyon Education, Inc. v. Ward,216 the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether an arbitration agreement was
unenforceable under the Borrower Defense Regulations, such that the
defendant-university could not compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s
claims.217 The Gwinnett County Superior Court found that the Borrower
Defense Regulations prohibited the enforcement of the arbitration
clause. On appeal, the university contended that the federal regulations
do not preclude arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims because these claims
do not qualify as “borrower defense claims.” 218 Before addressing this
argument, the court of appeals explained the governing framework and
purpose behind the regulations, which is to “protect student loan
borrowers from misleading, deceitful, and predatory practices of, and
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failures to fulfill contractual promises by, institutions participating in
the [United States Department of Education’s] student aid programs,”
and to protect taxpayer dollars.219
Next, the court of appeals examined the plain language of the federal
regulations.220 Specifically, 34 C.F.R. § 685.300221 provides that an
institution of higher education subject to the Borrower Defense
Regulations “will not . . . rely in any way on a predispute arbitration
agreement with respect to any aspect of a borrower defense claim.” 222 The
regulations also define a “borrower defense claim” as “a claim that is or
could be asserted as a borrower defense as defined in § 685.222(a)(5),
including a claim other than one based on § 685.222(c) or (d) that may be
asserted under § 685.22(b) if reduced to judgment[.]”223 The university
interpreted the term “including a claim other than” to mean that the
plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and misrepresentation are
expressly excluded from the categories of “borrower defense claims”
covered by the regulations. 224 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued
that the phrase “including a claim other than” simply clarifies that a
claim other than a breach of contract or misrepresentation can also be
asserted and that “non[-]breach of contract and non-misrepresentation
are borrower defense claims so long as they could be asserted as borrower
defenses under § 685.222(b) if reduced to judgment.”225
In addressing the parties’ respective arguments, the court of appeals
explicated that courts should “construe regulations and other regulatory
materials in much the same way we interpret statutes.” 226 That is, the
first step is to begin the interpretation of the regulation with its text to
give effect to the natural and plain meaning of its words. The court also
observed that courts may look to the regulation’s purpose “as well as the
broader regulatory and statutory context of which it is a part.” 227
Applying this principle, the court first considered both the definition of
the term “include” as well as Eleventh Circuit authority addressing the
exact same issue facing the court to conclude that “including” is used “in
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an expansive sense” to encompass breach of contract and
misrepresentation claims.228
The court also explained that the university’s exclusionary reading of
the regulations “would gut the regulations’ protections,” particularly in
light of the regulations’ stated purpose of protecting student borrowers
and taxpayer dollars.229 In short, relying on both statutory interpretation
principles as well as persuasive authority, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s “breach of contract and
misrepresentation claims fall within the breadth of borrower defense
claims” under the federal regulations, and, thus, the plaintiff’s claims
were not subject to arbitration.230
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